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I. The Rise of the Economic Loss Rule
Tort scholars and jurists have recently focused on what is often called Athe economic loss
rule@ in an effort to resolve its uncertainties.1  According to some authorities, the rule holds that
tort law offers no redress for negligence that causes only economic losses2 unaccompanied by
personal injuries or property damages.3   However, whether a rule so expansive is part of
American tort law is still open to doubt.4  There are many variations of the rule,5 and courts
often discuss its dictates only in relationship to products liability or contractual performance.  As
one scholar remarked, the law of tort liability for purely economic losses is Amuch less well
settled and less uniform than one might wish it to be.@6
A. Three Areas of Concern
An examination of the economic loss rule entails at least three areas of concern.  The first
is whether purely economic losses caused by a defective product are recoverable under tort law.
As discussed below, there is a high degree of agreement that the answer to this question is no,
absent personal injury or damage to other property.7
The second area of concern relates to whether a tort claim for economic damages is
viable when there is some other contract between the parties (e.g., a service contract or a contract
relating to nondefective goods8) which allocates or could have allocated the risks of economic
loss.  As to these matters, there is a consensus that the breach of a purely contractual duty is not
actionable as a tort if the only consequence is economic losses.  However, that modicum of
agreement quickly dissolves as application of the rule is charted.  There are numerous competing
formulations.  For example, Colorado holds that Aa party suffering only economic loss from the
breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach
absent an independent duty of care under tort law.@9  Wisconsin, taking a different tack, says the
economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiff=s tort causes of action if the Aclaimed damages are the
result of disappointed expectations of a bargained-for product=s performance.@10  Some states
endorse the view that Athe economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to claims for the negligent
provision of services,@11 and thus apply the rule only in cases involving contracts for the sale of
goods.12
The remaining area of concern is all of the rest of tort law, everything beyond defective
product- or contract-related claims.  In this vast residual territory,13 the operation of the
economic loss rule is not well charted, and whether there is a Arule@ at all is a subject of
contention.14  Some courts have expressly held that the economic loss rule does not apply
outside the defective product or contract contexts.15  Other courts state the rule so broadly that
they seem certain that it applies to cases in this category that have not yet been conceived.16  In
most states, there is precedent that is sympathetic to the idea that the economic loss rule might
apply in this residual field, such as the decisions holding that negligent interference with contract
is not actionable,17 or case law that saves persons who cause transportation accidents from
liability for the economic losses of persons relegated to alternate routes.18  But it is far from
resolved whether these pockets of no liability mean that there is a general rule, broadly
applicable,19 against tort liability for purely economic losses in contexts unrelated to product
defects or contractual performance.20 
B. Types of Tort Claims Barred
The economic loss rule, to the extent that it is recognized, is even more expansive than
first stated.21  The rule generally bars strict liability22 claims, as well as negligence.  This makes
sense because strict liability, at least in the defective products and hazardous activities contexts,
is merely a doctrinal substitute for negligence principles, which may make resolution of liability
issues more efficient or more certain.23  In cases where purely economic losses are caused by a
defective product or an abnormally dangerous activity, it is logical that if tort claims based on
negligence are barred by the rule, claims based on tort strict liability should be foreclosed, too.
Some authorities have taken the extreme position that the economic loss rule precludes
recovery even for purely economic losses caused by intentionally tortious conduct.24  Not
surprisingly, other decisions, employing various rationales, are to the contrary.25  Where
economic losses are deliberately inflicted via tortious conduct, there is little reason to save the
defendant from liability, whether under the economic loss rule or otherwise.26
C. Doubts and Exceptions
Doubts about the coherence of a generally applicable economic loss rule have frequently
been raised.27  Those concerns are bolstered by the fact that any broad statement of the rule
must be qualified by important, well-recognized exceptions.28   Not the least of these
qualifications are the causes of action imposing liability for misrepresentation,29 defamation,30 
professional malpractice,31 breach of fiduciary duty,32 nuisance,33 loss of consortium,34 
wrongful death,35 and spoliation of evidence,36 all of which may afford recovery for negligence
causing purely economic losses to the plaintiff.  So too, statutory causes of action, even when
based on negligence37 or strict liability38 principles, usually trump the judicially designed
economic loss rule.39  Courts also find that negligence causing purely economic harm is
actionable where there is a Aspecial relationship@ between the plaintiff and defendant.40
If the economic loss rule is held to bar intentional tort claims as well as ones founded on
negligence, the list of exceptions must even be greater.  Intentional tort actions based on fraud,41 
tortious interference with contract42 or with prospective advantage,43 and conversion44 
routinely allow recovery of purely economic losses.45  Moreover, theories of secondary liability,
such as aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty,46 may make a defendant liable to a
plaintiff for purely economic harm. This multitude of exceptions means that, contrary to the view
of some writers, the economic loss rule, in operation rather than theory, does not provide a Aclear
and predictable limit to liability.@47
D. One Rule or Several?
The truth may be that there is not one economic loss rule broadly applicable throughout
the field of torts, but rather several more limited rules that govern recovery of economic losses in
selected areas of the law.48  For example, the rules that limit the liability of accountants to third
parties for harm caused by negligence49 or that save careless drivers from liability to the
employer of a person injured in an auto accident50 may be fundamentally distinct from the ones
that bar compensation in tort for purely economic losses resulting from defective products51 or
misperformance of obligations arising only under contract.52
For purposes of convenience, this article will speak of the economic loss rule in the
singular, nevertheless recognizing that on the issue of whether there is one rule or several, the
jury is still out.  Thoughtful voices doubt whether there is a unitary theory53 and are arguing
against the Acrystallization@ of a single rule.54  Indeed, American Law Institute=s project on tort
liability for economic loss is now in abeyance, following the resignation of the Reporter.55  
None of the project=s initial drafts56 was approved by the Institute.57  The confusing58 mass of
precedent relating to tort liability for economic loss has yet to be disentangled and expressed
with the clarity commonly found with respect to other tort law topics.
E. Abundant Litigation
The terms and scope of the economic loss rule may be the subject of disagreement, but
there is no dispute as to the underlying reality.  Recovery in tort actions today for purely
economic losses is often difficult to obtain.59  Indeed, the obstacles posed by the economic loss
rule or related principles seem to loom ever larger.60  The economic loss rule was not even
taught in law schools as substantial legal principle a generation ago.61  However, today it is
covered in many tort casebooks62 and presumably taught in many classes.  Litigants regularly
assert the economic loss rule as a barrier to liability,63 often with success.64  So great is the
ferment that Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that
the economic loss doctrine was an issue before her state high court or intermediate court 47
times in a recent five-year period.65  She lamented that at Athe current pace, the economic loss
doctrine may consume much of tort law if left unchecked.@66
F. The Limits of the Economic Loss Rule
Of course, the obstacles to recovery posed by the economic loss rule should be no greater
than the justifications upon which the rule is founded.  Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex.
67
   Not surprisingly, the confusion over the terms of the rule is accompanied by further
uncertainty as to the reasons for the rule.68
Part II of this article considers the justifications advanced in support of the economic loss
rule, and in particular the argument that the rule performs a useful boundary-line function by
determining when contract-law principles supplant the law of torts.  Focusing on the boundary-
line rationale, the article addresses the application of the economic loss rule in a particular range
of cases.  That range includes only those cases where the question is whether the defendant owes
the plaintiff no duty under tort law because a contract (either with the plaintiff or a third-party)
defines the extent of the defendant=s obligation or because contract law is the sole source of
remedies for the harm of which the plaintiff complains.  Thus, in reference to the three categories
of concern mentioned above,69 the analysis relates mainly to categories one (sales of defective
products) and two (other contractual arrangements), and not to category three (the residual range
of tort cases where contractual principles are not being asserted as a limit on duty).  More
specifically, because the law governing claims related to defective products is so well
established,70 the focus here is primarily on category two.
Part III of this article probes the limits of the economic loss rule in reference to its
boundary-line function in three particular respects.  First, the article argues, as some courts have
recognized, that the rule generally should not be an obstacle to recovery if the plaintiff was not a
party to a contract with the defendant that is alleged to be the exclusive source of duty.71  Not all
courts have agreed with this contention.
Second, the article asserts that hypothetical remedies under contracts that were never
entered into should not bar recovery under tort principles.72  If there was never an exercise of
freedom to contract, there is no reason for tort law to defer to private ordering.  In many
instances, but certainly not all, tort law is an appropriate vehicle for remedying purely economic
loss.  Hypothetical contract remedies should not preclude courts from addressing the issue of
whether the defendant breached a duty under tort law.
Third, courts have sometimes erred in broadly ruling that claims related to independent
tort duties are barred if the damages relate to the subject matter of the contract73 or involve A
disappointed@ commercial expectations.74  The article contends that the operation of the
economic loss rule in these kinds of cases (and whether relief in tort should be available
notwithstanding the contract) should be guided by the principles that generally determine
whether one body of law displaces another.75  These principles can be deduced from the
jurisprudence that determines whether federal law preempts state law, whether statutory
provisions replace common law, and whether a contractual release from liability effectively
waives tort rights.  Remedies otherwise available under tort law should not be foreclosed merely
because a claim relates to the subject matter of a contract or because the parties could have
bargained over liability for the damages at issue.  Rather, whether contract principles displace
applicable tort remedies should depend on the terms of the parties= agreement and whether those
terms are consistent with public policy.  Only where a contract expressly or by necessary
implication elects to replace tort principles actually or potentially establishing an independent
duty should relief under tort law for purely economic losses be barred by the economic loss rule.
Finally, Part VI urges courts to be vigilant in ensuring that an unrealistic and unwarranted
endorsement of contract principles does not undermine the fault and deterrence policies that
animate American tort law.
II. The Policy Basis for the Economic Loss Rule
A. Broad, Speculative, Disproportionate or Insurable Liability
A variety of reasons have been offered to justify the economic loss rule,76 although those
reasons Ahave not traditionally been clear.@77  It is said, for example, that liability for negligence
that causes only economic harm must be uncompensable under tort law because allowing such
recovery would:
$ expose defendants to an unlimited scope of liability;78
$ impose liability for damages that are speculative;79 
$ result in liability that is disproportionate to fault;80 or
$ have a Achilling effect on non-negligent conduct.@81
These considerations carry weight, at least under some circumstances.  Yet, whether they
justify a general rule denying liability for negligently caused economic losses unaccompanied by
personal injury or property damage is open to question.  It may simply be that liability should be
denied whenever damages are speculative or excessive, or where harm to the plaintiff was
insufficiently foreseeable or was otherwise outside the scope of risks as to make it fair to hold
the defendant liable.  Indeed, general principles of damages and proximate causation already
recognize these concepts, and rules are in place to guard against liability for speculative,82 
excessive,83 or unforeseeable losses84 or losses outside the scope of risks that made the
defendant=s conduct negligent.85  Because that is true, these considerations offer little
justification for erecting a general economic loss rule.  Moreover, while there is a risk that
liability for negligent conduct might have a chilling effect on non-negligent conduct, Abecause
the line between negligent and non-negligent conduct is not a clear one,@86 there is no reason to
think that that problem is any greater in cases involving solely economic losses than in the great
mass of cases in which liability for negligence is routinely imposed.
Courts also sometimes find that liability for negligently caused economic losses should
be denied because those losses were more readily insurable by the plaintiff than the defendant.87  
This is an important consideration, for ability to spread a loss broadly and thereby minimize its
costs has been an important consideration in shaping the American tort rules governing liability.
88
 However, it is not always the case that a negligently caused economic loss is more insurable
by the plaintiff than the defendant.89  Moreover, the spreading of losses is only one of many
considerations that need to be taken into account in determining whether a duty of care should be
recognized.90  While the spreading principle can explain the rulings of courts in particular
situations,91 it cannot justify a generalized theory denying recovery for negligently caused pure
economic losses in a wide range of cases.
B. Avoiding Losses and Promoting a AHealthy Attitude@
Courts also assert that the A[a]pplication of the economic loss doctrine to tort actions
between commercial parties is . . . [intended] to encourage the party best situated to assess the
risk of economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk.@
92
  This, too, is an important consideration.  A[T]ort law should encourage individuals to employ
available resources to protect their own interests, rather than depend upon others to save them
from harm.@93  Obviously, the policy has force with respect to the purchase of goods.  However,
outside of that arena, it is difficult to generalize because in some cases risks may be more
foreseeable to the person engaging in an injurious activity than to the victim.  Thus one court
held that defendants were Aunder a duty to commercial fisherman to conduct their drilling and
production in a reasonably prudent manner so as to avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life
@ because the defendants were Aunmistakably . . . the best cost-avoider.@94
Writers sometimes suggest that the economic loss rule promotes a sort of individual
responsibility by encouraging injured persons Ato make up the economic loss by doing more
work the next day,@95 rather than through litigation.  There is merit to this idea, too, at least
where the economic loss is slight.  But the Ahealthy attitude@ rationale96 is hardly the basis on
which to construct a rule that bars recovery for all negligently caused losses, regardless of how
foreseeable or avoidable to the defendant or damaging to the plaintiff.
C. The Boundary-Line Function
1. When Contract Principles are Prime
If there is a convincing rationale for the economic loss rule, it is that the rule performs a
critical boundary-line function, separating the law of torts from the law of contracts.97  More
specifically, A[t]he underlying purpose of the economic loss rule is to preserve the distinction
between contract and tort theories in circumstances where both theories could apply.@98  This
paper will focus on the meaning and implications of the boundary-line rationale.  Further
exploration of the other justifications for the economic loss rule noted above (relating to overly
broad, speculative, disproportionate, or insurable liability or to who is the best risk avoider or
what promotes a Ahealthy attitude@) will be left to other authors99 or another occasion.
Purely economic losses, authorities urge, are more properly subject to resolution under
contract principles, which defer to private ordering, than by reference to tort standards.100  
Under the logic of private ordering:
individuals are the best judges of their own interests; individuals maximize those
interests through contracts; the expectation and reliance interests created by
contracts deserve protection; promoting private contracting produces a social
benefit; contract law provides the framework through which the individual and
social benefits are realized in practice.101
If a person wishes to be protected from economic harm, it is argued, he or she must
bargain for protection and pay the price of securing those benefits.102  One who fails to do so
has no right to complain that another has failed to exercise care to save him or her from
non-physical harm.  Put differently, the economic loss rule performs a critical
bargain-enforcement role in the conduct of human affairs.103  AThe prohibition against tort
actions to recover solely economic damages for those in contractual privity is designed to
prevent parties to a contract from circumventing the allocation of losses set forth in the contract
by bringing an action for economic loss in tort.@104
The boundary-line justification for the economic loss rule is plausible both in common
sense terms and on closer analysis.  A person who teaches or practices tort law would be quite
apt to explain that body of legal principles (in contrast to contract liability) as the law governing
compensation for personal injuries or property damages.105  While compensation is sometimes
afforded by tort law for economic losses, to state broadly that tort law offers redress for
carelessly caused economic losses would be both imprecise and over-inclusive.  In addition,
while there are certainly cases where tort law and contract law can and should offer overlapping,
alternative remedies,106 there must be a point at which tort law leaves off and only contract law
governs.  Otherwise Acontract law would drown in a sea of tort,@107 since tort law frequently
offers potential plaintiffs more generous terms of recovery.108  There would indeed be no
sensible stopping point if a party to a contract could recover under tort principles merely because
the other party failed to exercise care to avoid causing the first party losses of a purely economic
nature.
2. Product-Related Economic Losses
The boundary-line function of the economic loss rule is most clearly established in the
field of products liability.109  If a defective product causes physical harm to a person or to
property other than the product itself, a tort action may be brought.110  In contrast, if the loss is
solely of an economic nature, such as where a product defect injures the product itself111 or
impairs the product=s value,112 the plaintiff ordinarily113 is relegated to compensation under
contract principles.  Illustratively, if a person buys a can of paint and applies the paint to a door,
the person has a potential tort claim (and perhaps a contract claim as well based on breach of
warranty) if toxic odors from the paint make the plaintiff sick or if the paint eats away at the door
and damages that Aother@ property.  But if the paint simply fails to adhere to the door effectively
and flakes off, or quickly discolors, causing no other damage but making the paint=s purchase a
waste of money, the buyer=s sole avenue for recovery is rooted in contract principles.114
The economic loss rule operates sensibly in the products-liability field because the
commercial nature of the underlying transaction means that a contract-law remedy is not only
feasible, but routinely available.  The sale that produces the distribution of the defective product
allows the parties to determine how economic risks relating to the quality of the product should
be allocated and supplies default rules relating to warranties that resolves disputes if the parties
do not specify particular terms of recovery.115  In addition, the ubiquitous adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) means that there is a carefully crafted statutory mechanism
available for resolving economic loss claims.  At least one court has found the applicability of
the UCC to be pivotal.  In explaining its decision not to apply the economic loss rule to service
contracts, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin wrote:
Central to our decision was the fact that no body of law similar to the UCC
applies to contracts for services. . . .  [T]he UCC provides a Acomprehensive
system for compensating consumers for economic loss arising from the purchase
of defective products.@ . . . .
Concern about duplicating or overriding UCC provisions was an important
reason this court chose to adopt the economic loss doctrine in the first place. . . .
116
The abundance of products available in the American market theoretically makes it
possible for buyers to bargain for the level of economic loss protection they desire.  Referring
again to the previous example, a consumer can elect to purchase cheap paint or expensive paint
or something in between.  It is neither surprising nor unfair if Ayou get what you pay for.@
As explained by then-Chief Justice Benjamin K. Miller of the Supreme Court of Illinois:
The [economic loss] doctrine reflects the principle that there are varying degrees
of quality, all commercially acceptable, that parties to a commercial transaction
are free to bargain over if they choose. . . .  Disputes later arising from the
character of the materials used should be determined under principles of contract
law, and should be controlled by the requirements imposed by the parties= own
undertaking.  In that instance, the contract itself serves best to define the parties= 
respective rights and obligations.117
Nevertheless, important principles limit the scope of the economic loss rule in reference
to its boundary-line function.  In some situations, the plaintiff never assented to the terms of the
contract that the defendant asserts is the exclusive measure of duty.  The question then is
whether the plaintiff=s rights should be limited by the terms of such an agreement.  In other cases,
no contract was ever entered into by the plaintiff to mitigate or eliminate the risk of economic
loss, but theoretically there could have been a contract.  The issue is whether the pre-loss
availability of that hypothetical remedy bars recovery in tort.  Finally, in other situations, the
parties to a contract are subject to independent duties under tort law, but difficult questions arise
as to whether the terms of a contract, or contractual silence, override those otherwise enforceable
obligations.  These matters are discussed below.
III. Limits on the Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule
A. Claims by Persons Not in Privity
1. Contract Law as the Exclusive Source of Duty
A number of courts have rejected arguments that contract principles define the extent of
duty where the economic injurer and victim were not in privity.118  For example, in Russo v.
NCS Pearson, Inc.,119 students who took the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) sued a national
testing service for economic losses caused by the negligent scoring and misreporting of SAT
results.  The testing service, which was under contract with the College Board, but not with the
individual test takers, argued that the plaintiffs= claims were not actionable in tort because they
were based on the testing service=s misperformance of contractual obligations.  The federal
district court for the district of Minnesota rejected that defense and found that the plaintiffs
stated a claim for negligence.  The opinion explained: Ait strikes the Court as unfair to hold . . . ,
as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs lack a tort remedy because the alleged tort arose in the context
of the performance of a contract to which they were strangers.@120  The court was unpersuaded
that defendant=s contract with a third party defined the full extent of its obligations.
Similarly, in A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass=n, Inc.,121 the Supreme
Court of Colorado held that although Asubcontractors [had] assumed contractual obligations with
the developer and general contractor, these obligations did not and could not relieve the
subcontractors of their independent duty [under state court decisions] to act without negligence
in constructing the development.@122  Consequently, the economic loss rule did not bar a
negligence action by a homeowners association against the subcontractors seeking recovery for
economic losses.
Recognizing third-party rights under tort law in these types of cases does not undermine
the public policy in favor of private ordering.  Rather, it merely recognizes that private ordering
takes place not in a vacuum, but within a context of other obligations.123  When the issue of
whether economic losses are compensable relates to third-party protection, the intent of the
parties is not the only relevant consideration.
Fundamental tort policies are implicated as well: compensating victims of harm;
deterring wrongful conduct and providing incentives for reasonable conduct;
placing losses on those who can best bear or distribute them; and fairness . . . [in]
redressing harm caused to innocent parties and imposing the burden of harm on
the parties responsible for it.124
With respect to the boundary-line function of the economic loss rule, decisions holding
that third-party claims are not foreclosed by the rule make sense.  If there is no agreement
between the parties to a lawsuit, there is no risk that recognizing tort obligations will violate the
parties= freedom to contract,125 because there never was an effort to exercise such freedom.  If
the parties are not in privity, contract law does not potentially afford a remedy, except in the
relatively rare case of a third-party beneficiary.  Thus, respect for contract principles and private
ordering does not require that the economic loss rule bar the claims of persons not standing in a
contractual relationship.  The purpose of the economic loss rule is not to leave injured persons
remediless for economic losses, but to ensure respect for private ordering by relegating a plaintiff
to contract remedies in cases where there is an agreement between the parties allocating
economic risks.126  If there is no contract between the parties to litigation, there is no boundary-
line function to be performed by the economic loss rule.  
The reason that a third person physically injured by a defective product is permitted to
sue in tort for resulting damages is that such a person Agenerally had neither the bargaining
power nor the opportunity to bargain with its manufacturer or seller and so could not reasonably
provide himself with the same kind of protection that a purchaser of goods could.@127  Similarly,
nonparties to a contract typically have no real opportunity (and often little power128) to bargain
over protection from economic losses caused by negligent performance of the agreement.
Nonparties therefore should not be precluded from suing in tort for resulting damages. 
As noted above, a third-party beneficiary may have enforceable rights under contract law,
even though not a party to the agreement.  Does that mean that a tort claim by this category of
plaintiff against a party to the contract should be barred by the economic loss rule?  Presumably,
the answer is no.  It is one thing to defer to private ordering when the question concerns the
rights of parties to an agreement.  It is something else entirely to say that two parties to an
agreement may limit the rights of third parties (even third-party beneficiaries) who never
participated in the negotiation of the contract.  If established tort principles entitle a third party to
protection under tort law for economic loss, an agreement to which the third party never assented
should not be permitted to vitiate his or her right to tort remedies.
2. Recovery by Purchasers Against Defendants Not in Privity 
Occasionally, courts have held that the economic loss rule bars a tort claim related to a
contract even where the parties to the lawsuit are not in privity.129  These decisions can
sometimes be explained as a natural application of the economic loss rule in the context of a sale
of goods, as where a disappointed purchaser of a product sues the manufacturer or wholesaler of
the goods (rather than the retailer).130  A purchaser seeking purely economic losses should not
be permitted to complain, under tort principles, against anyone in the chain of distribution that
the product the plaintiff bought was not better (i.e., more effective, more valuable, or more A
reasonable@) than what the plaintiff bargained for under the law of contract.  Absent fraud131 or
some other breach of an independent duty,132 contract principles normally are the buyer=s sole
remedy for purely economic loss related to purchased goods, regardless of whether the suit is
against the retailer, with whom the purchaser was in privity, or against a wholesaler or
manufacturer up the chain of distribution.  In this type of case, it is the defendant (the
manufacturer or wholesaler), rather than the plaintiff (the purchaser), who is the stranger to the
final contract of sale.  With respect to purely economic loss, it is not unfair to bind the plaintiff
by the terms of the agreement to which the plaintiff assented.
3. Tort Duty Related to Performance of a Contract with Another
Questions arise as to whether a potential defendant=s negligent performance of a
contractual obligation owed to the third party can also be a breach of a tort duty to a person not
in privity (the potential plaintiff).133  Some cases answer this question in the negative134 and
inappropriately invoke the economic loss rule as a reason for denying recovery.  One such case is 
Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI Eastern, Inc.135  This decision is difficult to understand from
the perspective of the boundary-line function of the economic loss rule.
In Plourde, Hiltz, a subcontractor for a private construction project in the Town of
Pembroke, hired the plaintiff to supply gravel for the purpose of constructing a roadway.
Engineers employed by the town hired the defendant to test the gravel to determine whether it
met the town=s specifications.  The defendant erroneously determined that the plaintiff=s gravel
was inadequate and the plaintiff therefore was forced to incur the costs of removing and
replacing the gravel.  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that because the plaintiff=s
negligence claim against the defendant sought only economic damages, it was barred by the
economic loss rule, regardless of the fact that there was no contract between the plaintiff and
defendant which could have dictated the terms of a contractual remedy.  
It is hard to understand the basis for the court=s decision.  The court=s rationale was as
follows:
The policy behind . . . [the economic loss rule] is to prevent potentially limitless
liability for economic losses . . . .
. . . .
Moreover, permitting economic loss recovery in tort here would blur the
distinction between contract and tort law.  The plaintiff is essentially alleging that
the defendant negligently performed its duties under its contract with another
party and that as a result, the plaintiff has lost the benefit of its bargain with Hiltz
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .  The economic loss the plaintiff suffered in removing and replacing
the gravel arose Asolely from disappointed commercial expectations@ in that the
plaintiff Alost the anticipated profits of its contract@ with Hiltz . . . .  Imposing a
tort duty upon the defendant in this case would disrupt the contractual
relationships between and among the various parties.136
The court=s reasoning is questionable on several grounds.  First, this was not a case of A
potentially limitless liability.@  It seems entirely clear from the facts that if the testing of the
gravel was negligently deficient, it would affect the provider of the gravel, not some vast class of
potential plaintiffs, and that the economic losses would extend only as far as the cost of the
materials involved in the job, and no further.137  Moreover, allowing a negligence claim would
not Adisrupt the contractual relationships between and among the various parties@ because the
only duty that negligence law would impose on the defendant would be to exercise care in
testing the gravel.  That duty would have been entirely consistent with the obligations that the
defendant had already obliged itself to perform pursuant to its contract with the engineers.  This
is not the case of whether the court should recognize an inconsistent, competing obligation
which might interfere with contractual performance.   
More importantly, for purposes relating to the boundary-line function of the economic
loss rule, allowing the plaintiff in Plourde Sand & Gravel to sue for negligence would not Ablur
the distinction between contract and tort law.@  Contractual performance always takes place
within a matrix of other legal obligations, including those imposed by the law of torts.  For
example, it is no defense to a tort claim alleging negligent misrepresentation causing economic
loss that, at the time of the erroneous statement, the defendant was acting pursuant to a
contractual relationship between the defendant and some other person.138  Parties to contracts
have obligations beyond those imposed by the terms of their agreements.
To be sure, in cases like Plourde Sand & Gravel,139 there is a valid question concerning
whether performance (or misperformance) of a contractual obligation owed to one person creates
a tort duty of care to a third person who foreseeably may be injured.  This type of question is not
uncommon in tort law.  Cases often present the issue of whether a person performing a
contractual duty owed to one person has a duty to act to prevent physical harm to a third person.
Courts have held, for example, that mental health professionals who learn in the course of a
therapeutic relationship that a patient poses a threat of physical harm to a third person have a
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent that harm from occurring.140  Similarly, physicians
have been found to have a duty to warn third persons that a patient has a communicable disease
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 or to inform the subject of a physical exam conducted pursuant to a contract with an
employer of a diseased condition detected during the examination.142  
Other cases raise the question of whether a person performing a contractual obligation
owed to one person has an additional tort duty to another person to exercise reasonable care to
prevent harm to the third person=s economic interests.143  The drug testing cases offer a good
illustration.  If a testing service hired by an employer negligently performs a drug test on an
employee or job applicant, the affected test subject may be fired or rejected for employment, and
in either case will suffer economic losses.  A number of courts, influenced perhaps by the
reduced risk of indeterminate liability144 or the fact that the parties to the contract could allocate
losses relating to inadvertent errors,145 permit the test subject to sue the testing agency for
negligence, even though there was no contract between the parties and only economic losses
resulted.146  A minority of courts are to the contrary.147  The point here is that it is appropriate
for courts to consider these types of duty questions within the context of tort jurisprudence.148  
Depending on the facts and the interests at stake, some duty claims will be found to be
meritorious and others will not.  Blindly applying the economic loss rule to bar all third-party
claims related to contractual performance precludes courts from undertaking a thoughtful
assessment of whether a tort duty should be recognized and how far liability should extend.
Moreover, it does so without justification.  Under principles of private ordering, parties to a
contract may allocate risks among themselves, but they have no right to strip third parties of
whatever protection tort law provides for valuable personal interests.
B. Hypothetical Contract Remedies
Cases purporting to apply the economic loss rule for boundary-line reasons sometimes
seize upon the fact that the plaintiff could have contracted with a third person to address the risk
that gave rise to economic loss as a reason for denying recovery in tort.  Thus, some courts hold
that a hypothetical contract remedy makes relief in tort unavailable.149  From the standpoint of
the boundary-line rationale, this type of application of the rule is seriously questionable.
In Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ=s Wholesale Club, Inc.,150 a merchant failed to protect the
personal information of Visa cardholders.  The data was then hacked by a third party and
misused in unauthorized transactions.  The foreseeable result of the merchant=s negligence was
that a card issuer (a bank with whom the merchant had no contract) incurred huge economic
losses related to reissuing cards and reimbursing cardholders for fraudulent charges, as the bank
was required to do by its agreement with Visa.  The federal district court for the middle district
of Pennsylvania held that the negligent merchant bore no liability for the bank=s losses because
the economic loss rule barred the claim.  The court did not find that contract principles, rather
than tort law, governed the liability of the merchant to the plaintiff.  There was no contract
between the issuing bank and the merchant.  Rather, the court=s ruling was based on the fact that
the bank Acould have bargained for allocating the risk of fraudulent transactions with Visa before
signing its Visa contract.@151  From the perspective of tort jurisprudence, this is hardly a
persuasive reason for extending the economic loss rule to bar the claim of a party not in privity
with the defendant.  Considerations relating to both fault and deterrence argued in favor of
imposing liability on the negligent merchant.152  The effect of the court=s decision was to leave
blameworthy conduct unpunished and undeterred and a foreseeable victim uncompensatedBall
on the highly speculative ground that the plaintiff bank could have convinced a third-party, Visa,
at some earlier date, to change its policy on issuer reimbursement of fraudulent charges.  Tort
liability should be imposed to encourage safe practices, not to ensure that careless conduct goes
unremedied.  Using the economic loss rule to insulate blameworthy persons, such as a negligent
merchant, from liability for economic losses foreseeably caused to a third-person does not defer
to private ordering.  Instead, it undercuts important public policies relating to fault, deterrence,
and compensation that are the basis of American tort law.
The decision of the Banknorth court to deprive the plaintiff of relief in a negligence
action against the defendant, merely because the plaintiff could have, hypothetically, contracted
with a third party (there, Visa) to reduce or eliminate its risk of economic losses from fraudulent
transactions, comes perilously close to saying that contract law is the exclusive source of
protection from economic losses.153  That, emphatically, is not the law.  American tort law
routinely provides compensation for economic losses, such as lost wages and diminished earning
potential in cases of physical injury,154 as well as awards of solely pecuniary damages in cases
involving misrepresentation, professional malpractice, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, loss of consortium, wrongful death, and tortious interference, as mentioned earlier.
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  Some of those actions are based on intentionally tortious conduct, but others are founded on
negligence.  Tort law compensates economic losses in these cases because, within limits and
subject to restrictions, it imposes duties not to inflict economic losses.  While compensation for
economic losses is sometimes incidental to certain forms of personal injury or property damage,
either to the plaintiff or to another, many times it is not.  ATort law has traditionally protected
individuals from a host of wrongs that cause only monetary damage.@156  Contract law is not the
only source of compensation for economic losses, and it makes little sense to interpret the
economic loss rule as though that were the presumption.
In cases such as BankNorth, involving extensive pecuniary harm caused by negligent data
security,157 there may need to be limits on the liability of a defendant who acts carelessly in
order to protect the defendant from liability disproportionate to fault.  Cardozo=s language from
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,158 comes to mind.  He wrote that law should not impose Aliability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.@159  The point
here is not that there should be liability without limits, but that the economic loss rule should not
be invoked based on the hypothetical possibility that the loss could have been prevented by a
contract that was never formed to foreclose an inquiry into the issues of tort duty and scope of
liability.
In every situation where economic losses occur, it is possible to say that the plaintiff
could have entered into some type of contractual arrangementBe.g., an insurance policy, an
indemnity agreement, or a release from liabilityBthat would have mitigated the damage.  To seize
upon those hypothetical actions, which never came to pass, as a reason for applying the
economic loss rule is to substitute imaginary remedies for real ones and pretend that the facts
were other than those that actually occurred.  The boundary line drawn by the economic loss rule
should be between the real exercise of freedom of contract and relief under tort principles.
Imaginary remedies have no place in the analysis.
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.,160 the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed a boundary-line issue relating to the economic loss rule.  The question was
whether the builder of a vessel was liable for the destruction of equipment that had been added to
the vessel by an initial purchaser before it was resold to the plaintiff.  The court held that the
added equipment was Aother property@161 and that the economic loss rule did not bar recovery of
tort damages.  In reaching that conclusion, the court found that hypothetical contracts that might
have been entered into by the builder or the purchasers were essentially irrelevant to the analysis
of the case.  The court wrote: 
Of course, nothing prevents a user/reseller from offering a warranty.  But neither
does anything prevent a Manufacturer and an Initial User from apportioning
through their contract potential loss of any other itemsBsay, added equipment or
totally separate physical propertyBthat a defective manufactured product, say, an
exploding engine, might cause.  No court has thought that the mere possibility of
such a contract term precluded tort recovery for damage to an Initial User=s other
property.  Similarly, in the absence of a showing that it is ordinary business
practice for user/resellers to offer a warranty comparable to those typically
provided by sellers of new products, the argument for . . . replacing tort law with
contract law . . . is correspondingly weak.  That is to say, respondents have not
explained why the ordinary rules governing the manufacturer=s tort liability
should be supplanted merely because the user/reseller may in theory incur an
overlapping liability in contract.162
The economic loss rule should defer actual private ordering, not to a supposed preference
for contract principles that is inconsistent with the important public policies that animate
American tort law.
C. Non-Contractual Sources of Duty
1. Independent Duties Under Tort Law
In their efforts to articulate the limits of the economic loss rule, courts have focused on
the source of the duty allegedly violated for the purpose of drawing a distinction.163  Often, they
have articulated a bright-line test.164  Thus, the Supreme Court of Colorado wrote broadly:
Where there exists a duty of care independent of any contractual obligations, the
economic loss rule has no application and does not bar a plaintiff=s tort claim
because the claim is based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus falls
outside the scope of the economic loss rule. 165
Elaborating on this theme, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania quoted a decision of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina with approval:
The question . . . is not whether the damages are physical or economic.  Rather,
the question of whether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort for purely
economic loss turns on the determination of the source of the duty plaintiff claims
the defendant owed.  A breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of a
contract between the parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action
will not lie.  A breach of duty arising independently of any contract duties
between the parties, however, may support a tort action.166
Taking this approach, courts have held, for example, that actions for fraud,167 negligent
misrepresentation,168 and conversion169 are not barred by the economic loss rule because the
duties not to mislead or steal are rooted in general tort principles rather than in the terms of the
parties= agreement.  Conversely, if the plaintiff alleges a breach of fiduciary duty, but there is no
fiduciary relationship independent of the defendant=s contractual obligations, the claim will be
barred by the economic loss rule.170
2. Purely Contractual Duties
Focusing on the source of duty is useful because it weeds out cases involving nothing
more than an alleged negligent failure to perform a purely contractual dutyBa duty that would not
otherwise exist.171  Those types of cases should be governed by contract law.  Suppose, for
example, that economic losses are caused by the defendant=s failure to publish a Yellow Pages ad
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 or monitor an alarm system173 pursuant to a contract between the parties.  It makes sense
that the plaintiff cannot sue for negligence, for the only duties that have been breached are those
created by the agreement.  Similarly, if a fraud claim alleges merely that there was
misrepresentation about the characteristics or quantity of the goods sold under a contract, the
case involves a Amere contract claim cloaked in the language of tort,@ which therefore should be
decided under contract principles.174  AAs a general rule, a claim arising out of the provisions of
a contract must find remedy under contract law.@175  Put differently, A[t]he economic loss
doctrine stands for the general rule that >ordinarily, a breach of contract does not give rise to a
tort action by the promisee against the promisor.=@176
Holding that a breach of a purely contractual duty is actionable only under contract law
promotes the Aefficient revelation of asymmetric information.@177  This is true because in
contract law there is no liability for consequential economic damages without notice of special
circumstances.  Employing the economic loss rule to prevent recovery of economic damages in
tort forces parties to a contract to reveal relevant information that enables those with whom they
deal to assess how much care should be exercised to prevent a loss.178  However, the same
analysis does not apply when an independent duty is imposed under tort law, because in that case
there has been a judicial determination that considerations relating to fault, deterrence, personal
responsibility, and compensation warrant the imposition of liability.  In other words, those
factors outweigh whatever other general concerns the law might have relating to the need for
incentives to facilitate disclosure of relevant information.
Permitting an action for economic losses based on an independent tort duty does not
necessarily mean that the defendant will be liable.  Courts may still enquire into all of the
considerations which are taken into account in determining whether a tort duty of care exists.179  
Absent a finding of an independent tort duty180 (and breach181), the plaintiff has no cause of
action. 
3. Relationship to the Subject Matter of the Parties= Contract
The clarity of the independent duty rule is sometimes eviscerated by holdings that
provide that even if the breached duty arises from tort principles, the action is still barred by the
rule if losses relate to the subject matter of the contract.182
The application of the economic loss rule should not turn on whether the plaintiff=s
damages are related to the subject matter of the contract.183  To so hold is to formulate a rule
that is much too broad.  Consider, for example, the case of legal representation of a client by a
lawyer in a personal injury case pursuant to a retainer agreement.  Conduct by the lawyer
amounting to misrepresentation, professional negligence, or false defamatory statements may be
related, in a real sense, to the subject matter of a contract.  Yet, those claims are not,184 and
should not be, barred by the economic loss rule.  Indeed, it would be both odd and unrealistic to
expect clients to bargain with lawyers about not being misled, incompetently represented, or
defamed.185 
Moreover, it is easy to see how an exception based on the Asubject matter of the contract@ 
could easily be manipulated.  In Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. LifeCare
Holdings, Inc.,186 tort claims relating to a fee triggered by an amendment to a credit agreement
were allowed to go forward.  The federal district court for the northern district of Texas found
that because the credit agreement never mentioned or provided for an amendment fee, the
plaintiffs= loss was Anot the subject matter of the contract.@187  The court might just as easily
have interpreted the subject matter requirement differently and concluded that the amendment
and fee both related to the credit agreement, which was the subject matter of the contract, and
that, therefore, the action was barred by the economic loss rule.  No purpose is served by
endorsement of a legal test that is so susceptible to manipulation.
4. Contractual Preemption of Tort Law
A more useful approach to ascertaining whether contract law should displace tort
principles in a case where there is an independent tort duty is to think in terms of established
notions of preemption because that is what is actually taking place: contract law is preempting
tort law.  Put differently, the boundary line between what is actionable in tort and what is
actionable in contract is being moved.
There are at least three useful points of reference.  The first concerns preemption of state
law by federal law, another concerns displacement of common law by statutes, and the third
relates to written releases from tort liability.  Each of these sources of guidance suggests that
preemption of established tort principles should be recognized only in limited circumstances.
Federal law does not preempt state tort law unless that is the Aclear and manifest@ purpose
of Congress.188  Absent such a showing, a plaintiff is not deprived of state tort claims.  The text
of a law can expressly state Congress=s intent to preempt or, in limited cases, that intent can be
implied from the language and structure of a statute.189  However, there is generally a
presumption against preemption by federal law.190  Recognizing that state tort law serves a
useful purpose as the primary source of tort remedies, courts are reluctant to hold that federal
preemption alters the balance between freedom of action and liability that has been carefully
crafted by a matrix of state statutes and common law decisions.
Likewise, statutory law replaces common law principles only when that is the necessary
implication of the actions of the legislature.  As one authority on New York state law explains:
Where a change in the common law is to be effectuated the legislative intent to do
so must be clearly and plainly expressed.  When . . . a statute is intended to
abrogate a common law right or to confer a right not vested by the common law,
it will be so construed as not to go beyond the letter; and not even to that extent
unless it appears to be according to the spirit and intention of the act.191
Similarly, contractual releases from tort liability are strictly construed because they
threaten to undermine the important public policies relating to fault, proportionality, deterrence,
individual responsibility, and compensation that form the intellectual foundations of tort law.192  
A release from liability for physical harm is not valid unless it is clear, specific, and consistent
with the public interest.193  A release is not expansively construed to abrogate the plaintiff=s
rights under tort law merely because the release is a contract.194  Rather, the plaintiff=s rights
under tort law are waived only to the extent that the contract so provides, and only if the waiver
is consistent with public policy195 and fair to the plaintiff.  If these limitations regularly apply to
releases in personal injury or property damage suits, it is difficult to see why the same should not
be true with respect to purely economic losses.  It is hard to draw a persuasive distinction
between personal injury or property damage suits, on one hand, and economic loss suits, on the
other, based on the degree of harm to the plaintiff.196  Economic losses can be devastating,
sometimes much more so than minor personal injury or damage to tangible personal property.  
These lessons relating to federal law preemption, statutory supercision of common law,
and written releases from liability suggest a useful approach to dealing with issues relating to the
boundary-line function of the economic loss rule.  Federal law must manifest a clear purpose to
preempt state tort remedies; statutory law supersedes common law only to the extent necessary to
give effect to the statute; and a release from liability must clearly waive the plaintiff=s rights in
order to obviate redress under tort law.  So, too, it makes sense to hold that, with respect to the
economic loss rule, the terms of a contract between the parties abrogate otherwise applicable tort
principles only if the agreement clearly evidences an intent to do so or if such displacement is a
necessary consequence of the validity of the agreement.  Further, even if these conditions are
met, relinquishment of rights under tort law should be recognized only when depriving the
plaintiff of those rights is consistent with public policy.197  Boiler plate provisions in standard-
form contracts should be subject to careful scrutiny.198
There is no reason for the law to presume that the parties to a contract have bargained to
relinquish rights that arise under tort law.199  When economic losses relate to the terms of a
contract and the plaintiff alleges violation of a contractual duty, the plaintiff should be permitted
to pursue tort remedies unless the contract expressly or by necessary implication has waived
such rights.  This approach to defining the boundary-line between contract and tort is not a
startling departure from current practice, but in fact a clearer, more useful description of what
some courts are already doing.  Consider the example above relating to the amendment of the
credit agreement.200  The court held that tort remedies were available because the credit
agreement never mentioned or provided for an amendment fee.  In effect, the court was saying
that the parties= contract was insufficiently specific to displace tort remedies relating to such an
amendment because the subject was never addressed.  There was no express or implicit
preemption of tort remedies.
5. Disappointed Expectations
Courts sometimes hold that the economic loss rule applies because a plaintiff=s claim
involves merely disappointed expectations arising from the plaintiff=s bargain with the defendant.
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  For example, in Grams v. Milk Products, Inc.,202 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
addressed the issue of whether farmers who fed their calves a non-medicated version of a milk
substitute could recover in tort from the product=s manufacturer and distributor for physical harm
(poor growth and a higher mortality rate) allegedly suffered by the calves.  The court held that
even though the allegedly defective product had caused harm to Aother property,@203 which
normally is compensable, the tort claims were barred by the economic loss rule.   The majority
concluded:  Aif claimed damages are the result of disappointed expectations of a bargained-for
product=s performance . . . the plaintiff must rely upon contractual remedies alone.@204 
On the facts of the case, the decision is explainable and perhaps understandable.  The
plaintiffs, upon enquiring about a cheaper milk substitute, had opted to use one without
medication which sold for a lower price than the medicated version.205  The court found that the
claimed economic damages were Awithin the scope of the bargaining@206 between the parties.
Therefore, contract law provided the exclusive remedy.  As the court explained:
The record shows that the expected function of the milk replacer was to provide
sustenance for the Grams= calves.  The Grams expected that the . . .
non-medicated replacer would properly nourish the calves, much as the old
replacer had, so that the calves would grow.  This bargain was not about milk
replacer per se; it was about a product that would foster the healthy development
and growth of young calves.
What is troubling about Grams is not so much the result, but rather the court=s
endorsement of fragmentary language from a Michigan case stating that tort claims are barred by
the economic loss rule if Athe damage was within the scope of bargaining or . . . >the occurrence
of such damage could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties.=@207  There is a
great difference between harm that was Awithin the scope of bargaining@ and harm that Acould
have been@ bargained over.  That difference should be legally significant.  While the former
situation is a proper occasion for preempting tort principles based on deference to private
ordering, the latter situation is not because in that case displacement of tort remedies was neither
expressly provided for by the agreement of the parties nor the subject of actual bargaining.
Interestingly, the full quotation from the Michigan case (Neibarger v. Universal Coops,
Inc.208) is more limited in its reach than the fragmentary, but seemingly pivotal, reference in 
Grams.  The Neibarger court had written:  AWhere damage to other property was caused by the
failure of a product purchased for commercial purposes to perform as expected, and this damage
was within the contemplation of the parties to the agreement, the occurrence of such damage
could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties.@209
The Grams decision expressed its holding in terms of a Adisappointed expectations@ test.
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  The use of such language for determining whether contract law precludes analysis of
liability under tort principles is inappropriate.  The expression Adisappointed expectations@ is
imprecise and much too broad.  There are many cases where a plaintiff=s commercial
expectations are indeed Adisappointed@ and yet the economic loss rule does not bar relief in tort.
For example, if a potential defendant commits fraud in the inducement incidental to a contract
with the plaintiff, the plaintiff is sure to suffer Adisappointed expectations,@ yet most states permit
suit in tort.211  It would be preferable to avoid the language of Adisappointed expectations@ and
to inquire directly into whether the harm in question was within the scope of the actual
bargaining by the parties and whether recovery in tort was expressly or implicitly foreclosed by
the plaintiff=s entry into the contract.
  The careless, fragmentary quotation from Neibarger incorporated into the Grams 
decision has launched courts on an unfortunate and misguided line of inquiry.  Wisconsin courts
have interpreted Grams to mean that:
The Adisappointed expectations@A test is directed at determining whether the
purchaser should have anticipated the need to seek protection against loss through
contract.  This test focuses on the expected function of the product and whether,
from the purchaser=s perspective, it was reasonably foreseeable that the product
could cause the damage at issue . . . .
. . . .  Because the focus is on Areasonable foreseeability,@ it follows that an
objective standard applies: Should a reasonable purchaser in the plaintiff=s
position have foreseen the risk?212
Under this formulation, respect for private ordering based on the actual conduct of the
parties to the contract is replaced by an across the board preference for contract remedies in any
case involving a foreseeable risk of economic harm.  This is unwise for several reasons.  First,
any claim for liability based on negligence, or even on theories of intentional tort liability, must,
by definition, involve foreseeable harm.  The same is even sometimes true of strict liability
claims.213  Thus, the proffered formulation sweeps so widely in addressing foreseeable
economic harm that it does not draw the boundary line between contract law and tort law, but
rather substitutes contract law for tort law in a wholesale manner.  Doing so is imprudent
because it undercuts the principles of fault, deterrence, proportionality, and fair compensation
that properly find application in cases when questions of duty and scope of liability are resolved
by reference to well established tort principles.  As explained above, tort law frequently provides
redress for economic harm,214 and there is no reason to assume that even pure economic harm is
compensable only under contract principles.  Second, the formulation in question, which
relegates persons to contract remedies for foreseeable economic loss, is often impractical and
unworkable for the reasons related to lack of bargaining power or information, as explained
below.
D. Lack of Bargaining Power
 In their construction and application of the economic loss rule, courts have repeatedly
emphasized the inappropriateness of employing the rule to bar the claims of persons who never
had a real opportunity to bargain for contractual protection for economic losses.  Thus, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has remarked that A[w]hen the economic loss rule has
been applied, the parties usually were in a position to bargain freely concerning the allocation of
risk.@  Similarly, in another case, Chief Justice Miller of the Illinois Supreme Court explained: 
The cases in which . . . [the economic loss doctrine] has been applied are
grounded on the notion that the complaining party, if he wished protection against
the particular type of harm suffered, could have bargained for a guarantee or
warranty against it.  It is difficult to apply that concept in the area of legal
representation, where the purpose of retaining counsel is to obtain a representative
who will function as a fiduciary and will act professionally, with reasonable skill
and ability, to advance the client=s interests. 215
Concerns about lack of bargaining power explain why many courts have found the
economic loss rule inapplicable to tort actions against professionals.  However, the problem of
lack of bargaining power is more widespread.
Although some persons have argued that contractual principles should supplant
contemporary tort law in a wide range of circumstances,216 the history of American law in the
twentieth century217 counsels the exercise of caution to courts and legislatures faced with those
entreaties.218  Contractual bargaining over protection from economic harm is often slow,
difficult, and expensive, and, in many cases, a practical impossibility.  Consumers engage in
multitudinous transactions, and they often lack important information about the risks they face to
be able to negotiate intelligently over protection from those dangers.  As one court recently
noted, A[i]t goes without saying that many individual consumers have no meaningful ability to
negotiate with product manufacturers and distributors.@219  Of equal importance, the persons
with whom consumers conduct transactionsBcashiers at discount stores, registrars in university
bursars= offices, and agents at rental car countersBtypically lack authority, training, or incentives
to vary the terms of what are essentially intended to be take-it-or-leave-it transactions.  
Tort law can offer a more efficient path than contract law to deterring and compensating
some forms of economic harm.  Consider for example the problems posed by failure to protect
computerized personal information and the resulting losses caused by identity theft.  Because of
the numerous entities which maintain databases (e.g., credit card issuers, universities,
governmental agencies, and social networking websites), it would be virtually impossible for any
individual to negotiate with all relevant database possessors over the duty to exercise care to
protect personal information from unauthorized access.  However, the recognition of a tort duty
obliging database possessors to protect personalized information from hacking has the potential
to encourage safe practices by a wide range of potential defendants, as well as provide a
mechanism for distributing losses when they occur.220  Contract law principles could not be
nearly as efficient in performing that role. 
Relegating persons to exclusively contract remedies for purely economic losses will
effectively immunize defendants from liability in a wide range of cases.  This is undesirable for,
in many cases, unnecessary economic harm should be deterred through legal principles that
create an incentive for safe practices through risk of liability.
E. Waiver of the Economic Loss Rule
Insofar as its boundary-line function is concerned, the economic loss rule is premised on
a preference for private ordering.  It, therefore, makes sense that the protections afforded by the
rule must be subject to waiver by agreement of the parties.  In PNC Bank, National Ass=n v.
Colonial Bank, N.A.,221 a loan participation agreement expressly provided that the defendant
would not be liable Aexcept for . . . material breach of this Agreement or its own gross
negligence, bad faith or willful misconduct.@222  The federal district court for the middle district
of Florida concluded that the Aplain meaning@ of the language of the agreement controlled and,
therefore, the defendant Aeffectively waived any protection that the economic loss doctrine may
have afforded it with regard to an action based on negligence, bad faith or wilful misconduct.@
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IV. Conclusion
The economic loss rule performs a valuable function in determining which economic
losses are actionable only under contract law and not under tort principles.224  However, just as
contract law should not be allowed to drown in a Asea of tort,@225 the principles of tort law
should not be permitted to drown in a Asea of contract.@226  It is essential that the economic loss
rule be crafted and applied in a manner that adequately accommodates the Agoals of tort [law]B
deterrence of negligent conduct, interpersonal considerations of fairness, and compensationBthat
support liability@227 in compelling cases.  Unfortunately, attainment of this objective entails a
high degree of doctrinal complexity.  As Professor Robert Rabin has remarked:
[I]t would undoubtedly be more aesthetically satisfying to have an economic loss
rule that could be invoked without micro-scrutiny of competing policy
considerations . . . .  But bright-line rules grounded in single-dimension
justifications would lead to undesirable policy outcomes.228
In interpreting and applying the economic loss rule in cases involving contractual
relationships, the rule=s boundary-line function can be properly performed only by focusing on
the actual conduct of the parties to the litigationCwhat they did, not what they might have done.
Only where those parties have in fact engaged in private ordering to supplant tort remedies,
should relief under tort law be foreclosed by the rule as a matter of law.229  Hypothetical
remedies under contract law and a supposed preference for contractual allocation of economic
risks have no place in the analysis.230  The determinative factor is the actual conduct of the
parties.
An agreement to which the plaintiff is not a party provides no basis for limiting whatever
rights the plaintiff may have under tort law.231  Similarly, if the defendant has breached a tort
duty that arises independent of contractual obligations,232 that breach should be actionable
unless the parties= contract expressly or by necessary implication preempts such relief.233  The
fact the economic losses are related to the subject matter of the contract234 or involve
disappointed commercial expectations235 is irrelevant unless the facts establish that actual
private ordering has foreclosed relief in tort.
Expansive application of the economic loss rule to bar recovery under tort law in cases
where the parties to a contract theoretically could have, but did not, engage in private ordering,
neither defers to the conduct of the parties nor offers a remedy that adequately accommodates the
public interest in deterring unnecessary injurious conduct and forcing those at fault to bear the
costs associated with their activities.  The boundary line between tort law and contract law must
be fixed by reference to what the parties actually agreed in their relations with one another.
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